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family, and punishes behavior inimical to it. I would suggest there-
fore that the quest for a cure of AIDs, unaccompanied by any at-
tempt to modify the behavior out of which AIDS was generated, is 
ultimately futile. I would venture to suggest that if a cure for AIDS 
were discovered tomorrow, it would not be very long before a new 
venereal disease would make its appearance, just as herpes did in 
the 60s and AIDs did in the 80s. What is needed above all is not a 
medical miracle cure but a moral and behavioral change. 
As an abstract debater's point, one might perhaps distinguish 
between homosexuality and promiscuity. Some homosexuals, espe-
cially women, maintain "exclusive" relationships. These may re-
duce somewhat the incidence of venereal disease. If they are 
sufficiently discreet-that is to say, if they remain "in the closet"-
they may avoid the evil of scandal. "Marriages" between homosex-
uals would not solve any problems, however. It was not the lack of 
marriage certificates that produced the bathhouse culture, but 
rather the uncontrolled indulgence of sexual perversion. Legalizing 
sexual perversion could only make matters worse. Promiscuity, 
whether homosexual or heterosexual, is best controlled by moral 
constraint. 
No civilized person today wants to persecute homosexuals, or 
to see them suffer and die from horrible diseases. But it is equally 
true that no civilized person should wish to see homosexuality ac-
cepted as an equally valid "alternative lifestyle." 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW. By the editors 
of the Harvard Law Review. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 1990. Pp. 170. Cloth, $17.50; paper, $9.95. 
Beverly Balos 1 
I wish you would notice that you are heterosexual. 
I wish you would grow to the understanding that you choose heterosexuality. 
I would like you to rise each morning and know that you are hett"rosexual and that 
you choose to be heterosexual-that you are and choose to be a member of a privi-
leged and dominant class, one of your privileges being not to notice. 
-Marilyn Frye 
This book was originally published as a student-authored "de-
velopments note" in volume 102 of the Harvard Law Review. It is a 
broad survey of the discrimination faced by lesbians and gay men 
I. Clinical Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
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within several areas of the law, including the criminal justice sys-
tem, employment, family and marriage, and-more briefly-immi-
gration, insurance, and public accommodations. 
In its introductory section the book posits four conceptions of 
homosexuality. First is the notion that homosexuality is immoral 
and sinful. Conceding that this conception has had a powerful in-
fluence even in the twentieth century, the authors nonetheless assert 
that the view of homosexuality as sinful is less prevalent today. Per-
haps so, but one need only peruse Chief Justice Burger's concurring 
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick to realize that the "old" conception 
still has a powerful hold on many minds.2 
The second approach views homosexuality as deviant behavior, 
symptomatic of disease. This view led to an attempt to find a treat-
ment to cure the disease; sometimes the "treatment" involved the 
coerced institutionalization of lesbians and gay men. It should be 
noted that in 1973 lesbians and gay men were miraculously cured 
when the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexual-
ity from its list of psychiatric disorders. 
The third conception, which the editors call "neutral differ-
ence," rests on the view that homosexuals are entitled to legal pro-
tection and should not be legally penalized for their sexual 
orientation. This is essentially a civil rights approach. 
According to the fourth model, sexual orientation is a social 
construct: its meaning and consequences flow from the time, place 
and culture within which it exists. This approach rejects categori-
zation and views same-sex acts and relationships as not materially 
different from opposite-sex acts and relationships. Proponents of 
this view assert that the idea of a homosexual identity posits an 
essential rift or definitive division separating those who engage in 
homosexual from those who engage in heterosexual sex. Thus ho-
mosexual identity has as its origin an invidious classification that is 
only understood in terms of its "deviancy" from the "norm" of het-
erosexuality. Defining homosexual identity in opposition to hetero-
sexuality may run the risk of reinforcing the very constraints 
lesbians and gay men fight to overcome.3 While the fourth ap-
2. Chief Justice Burger asserted that condemnation of homosexual conduct is firmly 
rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards and that to find a fundamental right to 
engage in homosexual sodomy would be to "cast aside millennia of moral teaching." 478 
U.S. 186, 197 (1986). Despite the questionable accuracy of such assertions, the tone and 
content of the assertions themselves demonstrate that the unexamined view of homosexuality 
as sinful and immoral is still pervasive. 
3. The authors cite a number of commentators who espouse this view, e.g., J. Katz, 
Gay/Lesbian Almanac 7 (1983); Arriola, Sexual Identify and the Constitution: Homosexual 
Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 10 WoMEN's RTS. L. REP. 143, 156 (1988); 
D'Emilio, Making and Unmaking Minorities: The Tensions Between Gay Politics and History, 
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proach is the most theoretically interesting, the first three views 
continue to direct and structure the legal system's treatment of les-
bians and gay men. 
Turning to constitutional issues, the authors argue that sexual 
orientation should be a suspect or quasi-suspect classification for 
equal protection analysis, thus triggering heightened judicial scru-
tiny. Once heightened scrutiny is applied, so the theory goes, the 
government's alleged interest in most discriminatory action will fail 
to survive this more intensive review. Unfortunately, as the authors 
acknowledge, most courts that have considered equal protection 
challenges to discriminatory behavior against lesbians and gay men 
have not found sexual orientation to be a suspect or semi-suspect 
class.4 
Another legal theory, touched on only briefly by the authors, is 
that discrimination against homosexuals is not only discrimination 
based on sexual orientation but also gender discrimination. Because 
sexuality largely defines gender, discrimination based on sexuality is 
discrimination based on gender.s This view flows from the initial 
proposition that lesbian and gay relationships challenge the basic 
structure of patriarchy. Since the foundation of the male patriar-
chal structure is domination by men and submission of women, re-
lationships outside this structure are extremely threatening to men. 
Especially dangerous is the possibility of women choosing to make 
their emotional, intellectual, and physical connections with women 
rather than men. Women whose primary relationships are with wo-
men challenge male access to and privilege over women. Discrimi-
nation against lesbians and gay men and the criminalization of 
sodomy reinforce traditional gender roles. In a society that privi-
leges males, reinforcement of traditional gender roles is dispropor-
tionately harmful to women and perpetuates discrimination against 
them. 
This expanded redefinition of gender discrimination would en-
tail a heightened level of scrutiny of discrimination against gays and 
lesbians because gender has been viewed by the Supreme Court as a 
quasi-suspect class triggering an intermediate level of review.6 This 
14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 915, 917 (1986); Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 737, 780 (1989). 
4. See, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula 
v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1391 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984); Childers v. Dallas Police Dept., 513 F. Supp. 134, 147 n.22 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
5. See C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 248 (1989). 
6. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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may be a more successful strategy than arguing that sexual orienta-
tion itself should be a suspect or quasi-suspect class. 
The authors also note the historical denial of the existence of 
lesbians. For example, the traditional common law and religious 
condemnation of homosexuality did not encompass women. 1 Since 
sexual relationships between women were beyond the imagination, 
there was no need to criminalize them. However, invisibility and 
silence can accomplish censure and constriction as effectively as the 
criminal law. While briefly acknowledging the invisibility of lesbi-
ans, this book essentially continues the tradition. It does so by its 
failure to recognize that lesbians occupy a status that is essentially 
different from gay men, a critical difference that is only briefly men-
tioned in a footnote. While gay men are condemned for their be-
havior of loving other men (behavior that causes them to be in some 
sense similar to women and thus inferior), they still have access to 
and can take advantage of male privilege. Equating lesbians with 
gay men simply because both are stigmatized is to deny the reality 
of women's lives in a male dominated society. Lesbians and gay 
men do, of course, share some political goals and objectives. How-
ever, the sharing of some objectives does not negate the essential 
differences. Lesbian and non-lesbian women still lack economic 
privilege. Lesbian and non-lesbian women still lack cultural and 
political privilege. Lesbian and non-lesbian women are still subject 
to rape and battering. To ignore these differences between lesbians 
and gay men is to ignore the reality of the inferior status imposed on 
women by the dominant culture. 
The book ignores the uniquely dangerous threat lesbian rela-
tionships pose to the dominance of men. While the prospect of men 
choosing other men can be viewed as giving greater choices to men, 
the prospect of women choosing women is a challenge to male dom-
inance. This challenge to patriarchal culture places lesbians in a 
critically different status that needs acknowledgement by the law. 
This difference in position is exceedingly clear when one exam-
ines the origins of the institution of marriage. The historical status 
of women as property of their husbands and their disappearance as 
legally recognized human beings upon marriage is well known. 
This aspect of the marriage relationship as a repressive patriarchal 
institution that may have less than purely positive consequences for 
women is nowhere explored in the book. Rather, the desirability of 
marriage for lesbians as well as gay men is simply assumed, without 
consideration of the fact that lesbians and gay men do not approach 
7. See Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wise. L. REV. 
202 n. 75. 
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this institution from the same position in society. The book's failure 
to recognize and explore this difference is a weakness that preserves 
the marginalization of non-lesbian women and lesbians in legal 
discourse. 
Similarly, the authors fail to explore the intersection of race, 
gender, and sexual orientation. There is no acknowledgement in 
the book of the diversity of experiences of lesbians and gay men. 
In short, while I have some criticisms of this work, the authors 
are to be commended for choosing to focus on the issue of sexual 
orientation and the law for serious analysis. However, their failure 
to question heterosexist assumptions about culture and society per-
petuates the essential invisibility of lesbians and gay men. 
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These books address a subject fraught with a long history of 
controversy, the constitutional dimension of American foreign pol-
icy. Since 1793, when President Washington risked war by declar-
ing neutrality in violation of a treaty with France, presidents and 
the Congress have continued to debate their respective legal powers 
in the realm of foreign atfairs. 5 The executive branch has consist-
I. Professor of Law, University of California Davis, School of Law. 
2. University Professor Emeritus and Special Service Professor, Columbia University. 
3. Professor of Law, Yale University. 
4. Bradley Resident Fellow, the Heritage Foundation. 
5. For an excellent discussion of the origins of this controversy, see R. TUCKER & D. 
HENDRICKSON, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: THE STATECRAFT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 48-63 
(1990). 
